Rate Adaptation for Incremental Redundancy Secure HARQ by Mheich, Zeina et al.
Rate Adaptation for Incremental Redundancy Secure
HARQ
Zeina Mheich, Mae¨l Le Treust, Florence Alberge, Pierre Duhamel
To cite this version:
Zeina Mheich, Mae¨l Le Treust, Florence Alberge, Pierre Duhamel. Rate Adaptation for Incre-
mental Redundancy Secure HARQ. IEEE Transactions on Communications, Institute of Elec-
trical and Electronics Engineers, 2016, 64 (2), pp.765-777. <10.1109/TCOMM.2015.2514284>.
<hal-01273989>
HAL Id: hal-01273989
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01273989
Submitted on 15 Feb 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
1Rate Adaptation for Incremental Redundancy
Secure HARQ
Zeina Mheich1, Mae¨l Le Treust2, Florence Alberge1, and Pierre Duhamel1
1. Univ. Paris-Sud, UMR8506 Orsay, F-91405; CNRS, Gif-sur-Yvette, F-91192;
Supe´lec, Gif-sur-Yvette, F-91192, France
Tel: +33 1 69851757; fax: +33 1 69851765
e-mail:{alberge, zeina.mheich, pierre.duhamel}@lss.supelec.fr
2. ETIS, CNRS UMR8051, ENSEA, Universite´ de Cergy-Pontoise,
6, avenue du Ponceau, 95014 Cergy-Pontoise, France
e-mail: mael.le-treust@ensea.fr
Abstract—This paper studies secure communication based on
incremental redundancy (INR) secure hybrid automatic retrans-
mission request (HARQ) protocol over block-fading wiretap
channels. The transmitter has no instantaneous channel state
information (CSI) available from either main channel or the
eavesdropper channel, hence the coding rates cannot be adapted
to instantaneous channel conditions. We investigate the outage
performance for two schemes of INR secure HARQ protocols:
case 1) when there exists two reliable multi-bit feedback channels
from both legitimate receiver and eavesdropper to the transmitter
carrying a function of outdated CSI, case 2) when there is
a multi-bit feedback channel only from legitimate receiver. In
both cases, we demonstrate that using the information carried
via multi-bit feedback channels, the transmitter can adapt the
coding rates in order to achieve a better secrecy throughput
using a smaller number of transmissions comparing to the
ACK/NACK feedback channel model. For some parameters,
our rate adaptation protocol achieves a strictly positive secrecy
throughput whereas it is equal to zero for the protocol with
ACK/NACK feedback. We show that for some set of parameters,
the loss of secrecy throughput between case 1 and case 2 is very
small compared to the gain provided by both protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Automatic repeat request (ARQ) is a protocol for error
control in data transmission. When the receiver detects an error
in a packet, it automatically requests the transmitter to resend
the packet. This process is repeated until the packet is error
free or the error continues beyond a predetermined number
of transmissions. Thus the main components of an ARQ
system are an error-detection code and a feedback channel
from the receiver to the source. Hybrid-ARQ (HARQ) allows
to combine the advantages of both ARQ and forward error
correction (FEC). The FEC part of the system is an error-
correcting code aiming to correct errors at the receiver. At
the source, the packet, including the error-detection bits, is
encoded using a FEC encoder. After FEC decoding at the
receiver side, the parity-check bits allow the error-detection
decoder to decide on the necessity to ask for a retransmission
via the feedback channel. In this work, we consider incre-
mental redundancy HARQ which exhibits higher throughput
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efficiency by adapting the code redundancy to channel con-
ditions. In this scheme, when the first transmission cannot
be decoded reliably and a retransmission is required, the
transmitter sends additional parity bits possibly under different
channel conditions. The receiver combines the values of the
new parity bits with those previously received. Thus each
retransmission contains different information than the previous
ones. Incremental redundancy HARQ is easily realized with
rate-compatible punctured channel codes. In [1], the authors
provide an information-theoretic analysis of the throughput
performance of HARQ protocols over block-fading Gaus-
sian collision channels. References [2]-[4] focused on mother
code and their puncturing for incremental redundancy HARQ
scheme.
In addition to channel impairments, wireless communication
is also susceptible to eavesdropping due to its broadcast nature.
Consequently, the security of data communication over wire-
less networks has become an important concern. Traditionally,
security is implemented at the higher layers of the protocol
stack by using cryptographic techniques; however these tech-
niques rely on the assumption of insufficient computational
capabilities of the eavesdroppers. In his seminal work [5],
Wyner initiates the physical layer security by introducing the
wiretap channel in which a sender exploits the statistics of the
channel to send a secret message to a receiver in the presence
of an eavesdropper. Wyner assumes in his channel model
that the signal received by the eavesdropper is a degraded
version of the legitimate receiver signal. Then, this model was
generalized in [6] where the channels do not obey necessarily
any degradation relationship. The effect of fading on secure
communication was studied in [7], [8].
Going from security based on cryptographic tools to phys-
ical layer security is a paradigm shift which raises many
questions. One main objection to the physical layer approach
is the degradation assumption, which initially was assumed
necessary at an instantaneous level. In our setting, all channels,
including the eavesdropper’s one are characterized by their
average properties. This is a first relaxation of the constraints,
obtained at the expense of allowing some “outage” security
events, which will be monitored and maintained at an accept-
able level.
2In [9], the authors studied secure packet communication
over frequency-flat block-fading Gaussian channels, based on
secure HARQ protocols with the joint consideration of chan-
nel coding, secrecy coding, and retransmission protocols. In
particular, the error and secrecy performance of repetition time
diversity (RTD) and incremental redundancy (INR) protocols
are investigated based on Wyner code sequences, which ensure
that the confidential message is decoded successfully by the
legitimate receiver and is kept completely secret from the
eavesdropper for a given set of channel realizations. They show
that there exists a rate-compatible Wyner code family which
suits the secure INR protocol.
In the system model of [9], the transmitter obtains a 1-
bit ACK/NACK feedback from the legitimate receiver to
declare a successful/unsuccessful decoding via an error free
public channel. Incremental redundancy is also considered
under the assumption that the sub-codewords have the same
length in each retransmission. The transmitter can choose the
coding rates based on the knowledge of channel statistics to
maximize the secrecy throughput under reliability and secrecy
constraints. In this paper, we generalize the assumptions of [9]
by allowing the feedback channel(s) to carry soft information
through multi-bit feedback channels. We study secure commu-
nication based on incremental redundancy HARQ protocols
in two cases. In the first case, the transmitter makes use
of multi-bit feedback channels from both destination and
eavesdropper, carrying a function of outdated CSI, to adapt the
rate. The fact that the eavesdropper also feedbacks information
is clearly unrealistic, but this situation allows to propose a
solution for the case where there is no feedback from the
eavesdropper. A part of the results concerning the first case
was presented in [10] where it is shown that the adaptive
protocol with two-feedback channels can achieve significant
gain in secrecy throughput with respect to the non-adaptive
protocol. In this paper, we extend this study to analyze also the
effect of channel conditions on the achievable gain. Additional
contributions with respect to [10] include a second case study
in which we investigate a more realistic model, where only the
legitimate receiver sends multi-bit feedback to the transmitter.
The main originality of this work is that the proposed scheme
(case 2) does not require any feedback from the eavesdropper.
In both cases, the secrecy throughput is maximized by adapting
the coding rates at the transmitter based on the information
received via the feedback channel(s). This is done by allowing
the lengths of sub-codewords to change at each retransmission.
Due to the absence of instantaneous CSI, the transmitter
cannot adapt the coding rates to actual channel conditions. As
a result, outage performance of secure HARQ is considered
as in [9].
The gains of variable rate transmission over the fixed-rate
for the predefined families of code were shown in many
works as in [11]-[13]. Specifically, reference [11] considers a
point-to-point communication system where the reliability of
the communication is the only concern. However, this paper
investigates the rate adaptation for incremental redundancy
HARQ under both reliability and secrecy constraints. This
introduces additional and significant challenges in the design
with respect to [11] because the wiretap code requires the
joint consideration of the code rate and the secrecy rate to
ensure both reliability and security of communication. Hence,
we have introduced a new parameter in the design which we
have called “ratio of secret bit transmitted”. This parameter is
used to adjust the security level to a target value. An additional
challenge with respect to [11] is that the wiretap channel
involves two receiving nodes, which led us to the possibility
of designing two secure adaptive HARQ protocols (case 1 and
case 2) based on different assumptions on the availability of
the feedback channel from the eavesdropper. The rate adaption
policies are determined using dynamic programming method.
The optimization problem is more complex to solve than
that in [11], due to the presence of a secrecy constraint.
Then, the paper evaluates the performance gain obtained with
adaptive-rate transmissions over the non-adaptive rate. The
loss experienced with this scheme compared to the situation
with full information (case 1) is evaluated and comparison
to the non-adaptive protocol in [9] is also provided. It will
be clear from the numerical experiments that the adaptive
scheme outperforms the non-adaptive scheme independently
of channel conditions and that, for some particular channel
conditions, both adaptive schemes (case 1 and case 2) exhibit
similar performance.
The paper is organized as follows. The system model is
described in section II. In section III, the basic principles
of incremental redundancy and the transmission protocol are
briefly reviewed leading to the problem statement given in
section IV. The optimization problem under consideration is
tackled in section V in which a numerical solution based on
dynamic programming is given. The practical interest of the
proposed method is questioned in section VI. A comparison
with the results in [9] is also provided.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider the block fading wiretap channel in Figure 1 in
which a transmitter X sends confidential messages to a legit-
imate receiver Y in the presence of an eavesdropper Z which
listens to the transmission. Both the main channel (source-
destination channel) and the eavesdropper channel (source-
eavesdropper channel) experience K-block fading in which
channels remain constant over a block but vary independently
from block to block. At the transmitter, a confidential message
w with length Mi (information bits) is encoded into codeword
xN of N symbols x1, x2, .., xN . We assume that the code can
be constructed with arbitrary rate. There exists well known
codes which offer this possibility such as rateless codes [14].
Rateless codes can encode a message into a number of symbols
such that knowledge of any fraction of them allows one to
recover the original message (with high probability). Although
they are well-studied in literature to ensure the reliability
of communication systems, practical rateless code design for
secure HARQ protocols appears to be a challenging problem.
The codeword xN is divided into K subsets of the symbols xk,
k = 1, ..,K, called sub-codewords. The codeword occupies K
slots: for k = 1, ..,K, the kth block xk is sent in the kth slot
and received by the legitimate receiver through the channel
gain
√
hk and by the eavesdropper through the channel gain√
gk.
3+
+
×
×
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Figure 1. System model: the block fading wiretap channel.
The tth received symbol xt in the kth block is given by:
yt =
√
hk · xt + vt, (1)
zt =
√
gk · xt + ut, (2)
where index k indicates the block number, t = 1, .., N is the
index of the transmitted symbol, vt and ut are zero mean unit
variance i.i.d. Gaussian noise samples of the main channel and
the eavesdropper channel respectively at time t. We assume
that codeword symbols are samples of a zero mean real
Gaussian distribution with unit average power, i.e. E[X2] ≤ 1,
where X is a random variable denoting the transmitted sig-
nal. Thus the signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) received at the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are respectively hk
and gk at the kth transmission. We consider Rayleigh block
fading, thus the main channel instantaneous SNR, and the
eavesdropper channel instantaneous SNR are characterized by
two exponential probability distribution functions:
pH(x) =
1
h
· e− xh , (3)
pG(x) =
1
g
· e− xg , (4)
where h and g are the average SNRs of the main channel
and the eavesdropper channel respectively. We consider the
setting where the transmitter has no instantaneous channel
state information available from either the main channel or
the eavesdropper channel, but knows only channel statistics.
For each channel (main channel or eavesdropper channel), the
constant gain during each block is assumed to be perfectly
known at the respective receiver but unknown at the transmit-
ter.
Consider a single block transmission (i.e. K = 1) and
introduce Wyner codes. In [5], Wyner introduced the notion
of wiretap channel which is the simplest channel model that
takes security constraints into account. In a wiretap channel,
the source wishes to convey a message w ∈ W , which
is chosen uniformly at random from the message set W ,
to the legitimate receiver through the main channel. The
sender performs this task by encoding w as a vector xN
of length N and transmitting xN . Let C(N,R0, Rs) denote
the Wyner code used to transmit the confidential message set
W = {1, 2, .., 2NRs}. Here, N is the codeword length, R0
is the main channel code rate and Rs (Rs ≤ R0) is the
secrecy information rate. The basic idea of Wyner codes is
to use a stochastic encoder to increase the secrecy level [5].
We refer the reader to [15] and [16] for more details about
information theoretic secrecy. Throughout this paper, we use
Mi = N ·Rs to denote the number of information bits (which
is fixed) and M0 = N ·R0 to denote the total number of
bits transmitted, which includes the Md dummy bits that are
necessary to ensure secrecy. We define the “ratio of secret bits
transmitted” by γ = MiM0 =
Mi
Mi+Md
. The number of dummy
bits Md can be chosen by the transmitter according to channel
statistics. We can observe that γ ∈ [0, 1]. When γ is close to
0, the secrecy is more robust since the number Md of dummy
bits is large. At the opposite, when γ is close to 1, the number
Md of dummy bit is small and the secrecy is less robust.
Assume that the transmitted signals are received at the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper via channel SNRs
h and g respectively. Let Pe(h) be the average decoding error
probability for the legitimate receiver:
Pe(h) =
∑
w∈W
Pr{wˆ 6= w|w sent, h}Pr(w), (5)
where wˆ is the output of the legitimate decoder after observing
yN given that the message w is sent. To measure the amount
of information that the eavesdropper receives about W , we use
the following normalized conditional entropy H(W |g, zN )/N
which is called the equivocation rate. We want the equivoca-
tion rate to be as high as possible, and ideally it should equal
the rate Rs. Thus (weak) secrecy1 is achieved if for all  > 0
the equivocation rate satisfies:
H(W |g, zN )
N
≥ H(W )
N
− . (6)
We recall now the definition 1 in [9] about good code, for
the sake of clarity and completeness in presentation. A code
C of length N is good for a wiretap channel with the channel
SNRs pair (h, g) if Pe(h) ≤  (reliability condition) and the
secrecy requirement (6) can be achieved (security condition)
for all  > 0 and sufficiently large N . According to [9,
Definition 2], the secure channel set, for a given pair of rates
(R0, Rs) and a fixed input distribution p(x), is the union of
all channel pair (h, g) satisfying:
R0 ≤ I(X;Y ), (7)
R0 −Rs ≥ I(X;Z). (8)
In [9, Lemma 1] the authors prove also that there exists a
Wyner code C ∈ C(N,R0, Rs), generated based on p(x), good
for all channel pairs (h, g) belonging to the secure set (7)-(8).
The codebook is revealed to all nodes. We further assume
that the coding is random with long codewords and that
receivers implement typical-set decoding which allows to find
the performance limits for any practical scheme.
III. INCREMENTAL REDUNDANCY SECURE HARQ
PROTOCOLS
Consider incremental redundancy secure HARQ as a trans-
mission protocol. Hereafter, we describe this protocol in the
case where one-bit feedback is available from the legitimate
receiver. The mother code in the INR secure HARQ is a Wyner
1In [9], this condition is called “perfect secrecy”. However, in this work, we
assume that perfect secrecy is restricted to Shannon’s definition which requires
exact statistical independence between the message and its corresponding
codeword.
4code of length N . The N -symbols of the codeword are divided
into K sub-codewords xk, k = 1, ..,K each one being of
length Nk where N =
∑K
k=1Nk. The ARQ process starts by
sending the first sub-codeword x1 under the channel SNRs pair
(h1, g1). Decoding of this code is performed at the receiver,
while the secrecy level is measured at the eavesdropper. The
transmitted N1 symbols form a codeword of a punctured
Wyner code of length N1 [9]. If a second retransmission is
requested by the receiver due to unsuccessful decoding via
a NACK feedback message, the second sub-codeword x2 is
sent under possibly different channel conditions (h2, g2). Now
decoding and equivocation calculation are performed at the
receiver and the eavesdropper respectively by combining the
previous block x1 with the new block x2. The transmitted
symbols until the kth transmission form also a codeword of
a punctured Wyner code of length
∑k
i=1Ni. This continues
until the maximum number of transmission attempts K is
reached or until successful decoding of the message at the
legitimate receiver. Thus, the length of the overall transmitted
codeword (
∑K
i=1Ni, where K is the last transmission) is not
fixed at the transmitter (in general, it is less or equal than N )
because it depends on the feedback messages. Figure 2 gives
an illustration of the incremental redundancy scheme when the
receiver decodes successfully all information bits at the third
transmission.
In the system model of [9], the transmitter obtains a 1-
bit ACK/NACK feedback from the legitimate receiver to de-
clare successful/unsuccessful decoding via an error free public
channel. The authors considered an incremental redundancy
scheme based on rate-compatible Wyner secrecy codes, when
the K sub-codewords xk have the same length. They proved
the existence of good Wyner code sequences, which ensure
reliability and security conditions for an HARQ session under
certain channel realizations. In this work, we study the case
where the transmitter uses multi-bit feedback channels from
both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper or from the
legitimate receiver only, and which are assumed error free.
Based on this, an adaptive scheme is provided in which the
transmitter may adapt the sub-codewords xk length to the
actual situation (Figure 2). On a practical side, we can assume
that the sub-codewords corresponding to different messages
are gathered in frames that have a fixed number of symbols.
This assumption allows to deal with variable-length codewords
implementability in TDMA-type communication systems and
to compare with the non-adaptive protocol in [9] for the same
fading block length (cf. [11, Fig. 1]).
After k transmissions, each receiver applies maximum like-
lihood decoding based on all received channel observations.
The condition of successful decoding at the legitimate receiver
after k transmissions is that the average accumulated mutual
information is larger than the overall transmission rate. This
condition was written for equal length sub-codewords in (7).
In our system model where the sub-codewords xk may not
have the same length, this condition reads:∑k
l=1 C
D
l ·Nl∑k
l=1Nl
≥ M0∑k
l=1Nl
, (9)
where Nl is the duration of the sub-codeword sent at lth
sub-codeword 1
information bits
sub-codeword 1 sub-codeword 2
information bits
sub-codeword 1 sub-codeword 2 sub-codeword 3
information bits
Transmission with x1
Second transmission with x2
Third transmission with x3
Figure 2. Illustration of the decoding process when the transmitter uses
incremental redundancy scheme. Firstly, the transmitter sends “sub-codeword
1” and the legitimate receiver tries to extract the information bits from
the received sequence. The distorted yellow rectangle means that legitimate
receiver has failed to decode. Then, the legitimate receiver sends a NACK to
the transmitter which transmits the “sub-codeword 2”. This process continues
until a successful decoding by the legitimate receiver or until the maximum
number of transmission is reached.
transmission and CDl = I(X;Y |hl) = 12 log2(1 + hl) since
a Gaussian input alphabet was assumed. For convenience, we
normalize the values of Nl using ρl = NlM0 which is interpreted
as the redundancy brought by the lth sub-codeword. Now (9)
can be written as follows:
IDk
4
=
k∑
l=1
CDl · ρl ≥ 1. (10)
The condition for secrecy at the eavesdropper after k trans-
missions is that the average accumulated mutual information
should be less than the difference between the transmission
rate (the main channel code rate) and the secrecy information
rate: ∑k
l=1 C
E
l ·Nl∑k
l=1Nl
≤ M0 −Mi∑k
l=1Nl
, (11)
equivalently,
IEk
4
=
k∑
l=1
CEl · ρl + γ ≤ 1, (12)
where CEl = I(X;Z|gl) = 12 log2(1 + gl), and γ = MiM0 .
This condition was given in (8) for K = 1. In (10) and
(12), we observe that IDk and I
E
k increase with k, for some
ρk and γ, k = 1, ..,K. This characterizes the existence of a
tradeoff between the reliability and secrecy requirements. The
conditions (9) and (11) that guarantee the existence of a “good
code” can be proven using the results in [9, Theorem 1] and
[17, Theorem 4].
We assume that the transmitter uses error-free multi-bit
feedback channels either from both the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper or from the legitimate receiver only,
depending on the situation. From (10) and (12) we observe
that the decoding error events and the non-security events
in the k-th transmission at the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper depend on two set of quantities : IDk−1 and I
E
k−1
which can be communicated to the sender via the multi-bit
feedback channels and on CDk and C
E
k which are unknown
5at the transmitter due to the absence of instantaneous CSI.
Consequently, IDk−1 and I
E
k−1 are the only parameters which
can be used by the transmitter to adapt the redundancy ρk via
a scalar function.
We consider two cases of redundancy adaptation:
• Case 1: where the legitimate receiver and the eavesdrop-
per send at the kth transmission the values of IDk−1 and
IEk−1 obtained from the previous transmission (k − 1) to
the transmitter using multi-bit feedback channels. Thus,
IDk−1 and I
E
k−1 are the parameters required to adapt the
redundancy ρk. We consider the following policy for the
transmission attempt k
ρk = ρk(I
D
k−1, I
E
k−1), k = 1, ...,K,
where
ρk =

ρk(I
D
k−1, I
E
k−1) if I
D
k−1 < 1 and I
E
k−1 ≤ 1,
ρk(I
D
k−1) if I
D
k−1 < 1 and I
E
k−1 > 1,
0 otherwise.
(13)
The first condition in (13) corresponds to the case where
the message is kept secret from eavesdropping but not yet
decoded successfully by the legitimate receiver (existence
of a connection outage), until the (k− 1)th transmission.
The second condition characterizes the existence of a
secrecy outage while the legitimate receiver still not
capable to decode successfully the message at the (k−1)th
transmission. The last condition corresponds to the end
of the transmission due to successful decoding of the
intended message by the legitimate receiver.
• Case 2: where only legitimate receiver sends the value of
IDk−1 to the transmitter via the feedback channel. In this
case, which is more realistic than case 1, ρk is adapted
using IDk−1 only
ρk =
 ρk(I
D
k−1) if I
D
k−1 < 1,
0 otherwise.
(14)
The first condition in (14) corresponds to the case where
the legitimate receiver has not decoded successfully the
message at the (k−1)th transmission, thus the transmitter
continues the ARQ transmission process. In the second
condition, the transmitter finishes the transmission in the
opposite case.
We should note that throughout the manuscript, we may drop
the dependence of ρk on IDk−1 and I
E
k−1 in case 1 or I
D
k−1 in
case 2, and use only the notation ρk. However, it should be
kept in mind that the ρk are functions of feedback value(s).
The main difference between our work and [9] is that [9]
considers the special case where ρk = ρ ∀k, so we refer to the
INR secure HARQ studied in [9] as the non-adaptive scheme.
The goal now is to find the rate adaptation policies ρk, for each
possible value of the pair (IDk−1, I
E
k−1) in case 1 and I
D
k−1
in case 2, and γ which maximize the performance criterion
defined in the next section.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The secrecy throughput is a relevant performance criterion
to evaluate secure HARQ protocols as it can be directly related
to the channel secrecy capacity. Based on the renewal-reward
theorem [1], [18], the secrecy throughput is defined by the
ratio between the number of information bits received reliably
by the destination M∗i and the expected number of channel
uses N required by the HARQ protocol to deliver the packet
in up to K transmission attempts:
η =
M∗i
N
.
Since the transmitter has no instantaneous channel informa-
tion, we consider here the outage performance of secure
HARQ protocols. Hence, the service quality is acceptable as
long as the percentage of information bits not successfully
decoded by the legitimate receiver is less than ξe and the
percentage of information bits successfully decoded by the
eavesdropper is less than ξs. Thus, we define the connection
outage probability f0 by the probability of decoding failure
after K transmissions at the legitimate receiver and the secrecy
outage probability fs by the probability of a successful decod-
ing at the eavesdropper in the last transmission. The outage
probabilities are used to characterize the tradeoff between
the reliability of the legitimate communication link and the
confidentiality with respect to the eavesdropper’s link. The
optimization problem under consideration is stated below.
Result 1 (Secrecy throughput): The secrecy throughput
reads:
η(γ, ρ1, ..., ρK) =

γ · 1−f0∑K
k=1 EID
k−1,I
E
k−1
{ρk(IDk−1,IEk−1)}
in case 1,
γ · 1−f0∑K
k=1 EID
k−1
{ρk(IDk−1)}
in case 2.
(15)
Where f0 depends also on the ρk for k = 1, ..,K.
Proof: We have M∗i = Mi · (1 − f0) where f0 is the
connection outage probability.
The expected number of channel uses is given by N =∑K
k=1Nk, where Nk is the expected number of channel uses
in the kth transmission attempt:
Nk = E{Nk} = E{M0 · ρk}. (16)
Hence,
Nk =

M0 · EIDk−1,IEk−1{ρk(IDk−1, IEk−1)}
= M0 ·
∫ 1
0
dx
∫∞
γ
dy ρk(x, y) · pIDk−1 IEk−1(x, y)
in case 1,
M0 · EIDk−1{ρk(IDk−1)}
= M0 ·
∫ 1
0
dx · ρk(x) · pIDk−1(x)
in case 2.
which completes the proof.
6Result 2 (Connection outage probability): The connection
outage probability reads:
f0 = Pr{IDK < 1} = ECD1 ,..,CDK{I(I
D
K < 1)} (17)
=
∫ 1
0
dx
∫ ∞
γ
dy pIDK IEK (x, y), (18)
where I(x) = 1 if x is true and I(x) = 0 if x is false,
pIDK IEK (x, y) is the joint probability density function (pdf) of
IDK and I
E
K where I
D
K ∈ [0,∞) and IEK ∈ [γ,∞).
The secrecy outage probability is given in the result below.
Result 3 (Secrecy outage probability): Let K denote the
random variable of the number of transmissions in an HARQ
session (the index of the last transmission). The secrecy outage
probability fs reads:
fs =
K∑
k=1
Pr(K = k) · Pr(IEk > 1), (19)
where
Pr(IEk > 1) = ECE1 ,..,CEk {I(I
E
k > 1)} (20)
=
∫ 1
0
dx
∫ ∞
1
dy pIDk IEk (x, y), (21)
and where
Pr(K = k) = ECD1 ,..,CDk−1{I(I
D
k−1 < 1)}−
ECD1 ,..,CDk {I(I
D
k < 1)} for k < K, (22)
and
Pr(K = K) = Pr(IDK−1 < 1) = ECD1 ,..,CDK−1{I(I
D
K−1 < 1)}.
(23)
Proof: The secrecy outage probability fs can be expressed
as
fs = Pr(I
E
K > 1) =
K∑
k=1
Pr(IEK > 1,K = k),
leading to
fs =
K∑
k=1
Pr(K = k) · Pr(IEk > 1).
The event {K = k}, i.e. the last transmission number is k,
happens when the last transmission in which the legitimate
receiver has decoded successfully the message is the kth trans-
mission, for k < K. However, the event {K = K} happens
when the legitimate receiver has not decoded yet the message
at the (k − 1)th transmission indifferently if the decoding is
successful or not at the kth transmission because the maximum
number of transmission is achieved. Thus, the probability
mass function of K can be expressed as [9]: Pr(K = k) =
Pr(IDk−1 < 1, I
D
k ≥ 1) = Pr(IDk−1 < 1) − Pr(IDk <
1) = ECD1 ,..,CDk−1{I(IDk−1 < 1)} − ECD1 ,..,CDk {I(IDk < 1)}
for k < K and Pr(K = K) = Pr(IDK−1 < 1) =
ECD1 ,..,CDK−1{I(IDK−1 < 1)}.
The secrecy throughput in (15) depends on the channel model
and on the coding and decoding scheme. Here, we assume
that the coding and decoding scheme is capacity-achieving
as in [1] and as a result, we provide the performance limits
for any practical scheme. The secrecy throughput optimization
problem under outages constraints reads:
max
γ,ρ1,...,ρK
η(γ, ρ1, ..., ρK)
s.t.
{
f0 ≤ ξ
fs ≤ ξs (24)
where ξ and ξs are the target outage probabilities and where
the expression of η(γ, ρ1, ..., ρK), f0 and fs are given in
results 1 to 3.
V. CONSTRAINED SECRECY THROUGHPUT OPTIMIZATION
USING DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
The design of the adaptive incremental redundancy HARQ
scheme consists in finding the rate adaptation policies ρk, k =
1, ...,K and γ which maximize the secrecy throughput under
constraints on outage probabilities. Based on channel statistics,
we can obtain the code parameters that achieve the maximum
secrecy throughput while satisfying the outage constraints.
Obviously, solving the multidimensional problem (24) using
exhaustive search over all optimization variables would be
unmanageable. Therefore, we separate the problem as an
exhaustive search to optimize γ. Thus, we solved problem
(24) for many different values of γ ∈ [0, 1], and for each of
these γ ∈ [0, 1], we maximize the secrecy throughput subject
to ρk only. The optimization problem can now be written as
max
ρ1,...,ρK
η(γ; ρ1, ..., ρK)
s.t.
{
f0 ≤ ξ
fs ≤ ξs (25)
Note that f0 and fs depend on the ρk for k = 1, ..,K.
We will describe later how to make the choice of γ in
the simulations. Assume now that γ is fixed to an arbitrary
value in [0, 1]. In the following, we propose an algorithm
to solve (25) using the “dynamic programming” approach
for the two cases under study. The proposed solution is not
guaranteed to be a global optimum but can bring, as shown
later, significant improvements in secrecy throughput with
respect to that proposed in [9].
A. Constrained secrecy throughput optimization for a fixed γ
in case 1
Recall that in case 1, the transmitter uses feedback channels
from both legitimate receiver and eavesdropper i.e. ρk =
ρk(I
D
k−1, I
E
k−1), k = 1, ..,K. The optimization procedure is
described below. This is an off-line procedure intended to
compute the optimal values of ρk for any values of feedback
channels, IDk−1 and I
E
k−1. The optimization is based on dy-
namic programming. A similar method was used in [11] for
a point-to-point communication system without eavesdropper.
We provide here an extension in the context of secure com-
munications. Let R = {ρ} denote the set of all adaptation
policies functions with ρ = (ρ1, .., ρK). Also define as
Rξ,ξs = {ρ : f0(ρ) = ξ, fs(ρ) = ξs} the set of all adaptation
policies leading to a connection outage f0(ρ) = ξ and a
7secrecy outage fs(ρ) = ξs. Consequently, the optimization
problem in (25) can be written as:
ηˆ = max
ξ∗≤ξ,ξ∗s≤ξs
max
ρ∈Rξ∗ ,ξ∗s
γ · 1− ξ
∗

D(ρ)
(26)
= max
ξ∗≤ξ,ξ∗s≤ξs
γ · 1− ξ
∗

minρ∈Rξ∗ ,ξ∗s D(ρ)
(27)
= max
ξ∗≤ξ,ξ∗s≤ξs
γ · 1− ξ
∗

U(ξ∗ , ξ∗s )
(28)
where ξ and ξs are the target outage probabilities, D(ρ) =∑K
k=1 EIDk−1,IEk−1
{
ρk(I
D
k−1, I
E
k−1)
}
is the denominator in the
throughput expression (15), and U(ξ∗ , ξ
∗
s ) is given by:
U(ξ, ξs) = min
ρ∈R
D(ρ) s.t. f0(ρ) = ξ and fs(ρ) = ξs.
(29)
The design of adaptation policies requires solving the auxiliary
optimization problem in (29). Then, we form a dual problem
using Lagrangian multipliers λ1 and λ2 for the constraints on
f0 and fs:
Jλ1,λ2 = min
ρ∈R
D(ρ) + λ1 ·
(
f0(ρ)− ξ
)
+ λ2 ·
(
fs(ρ)− ξs
)
.
(30)
The notation Jλ1,λ2 means that the solution depends on the
choice of λ1 and λ2.
We are interested in evaluating U(ξ, ξs) for many values
of ξ and ξs. Since for each couple of λ1 and λ2 corresponds
a connection outage f0 and a secrecy outage fs, we can solve
(30) for different λ1 and λ2. Thus, to solve (15) we employ
auxiliaries weighting multipliers λ1 and λ2 and try to minimize
the denominator of (15), f0 and fs at the same time as:
Jλ1,λ2 = min
ρ1,...,ρK
K∑
k=1
EIDk−1,IEk−1
{
ρk(I
D
k−1, I
E
k−1)
}
+ λ1 · f0(ρ1, ..., ρK) + λ2 · fs(ρ1, ..., ρK). (31)
The terms λ1 · ξ and λ2 · ξs are removed since they are
irrelevant to the optimization.
Since the convexity of the optimization problem is un-
known, we solve problem (31) for multiple initialization of
(λ1, λ2), to increase the probability of falling into a global
optimum. Then we obtain a set of λ1 and λ2 values associated
with the corresponding throughput η∗λ1,λ2 , and the corre-
sponding outage probabilities fλ1,λ20 and f
λ1,λ2
s . From this
set, we choose λ1 and λ2 which maximize η while satisfying
the outage probabilities constraints in order to solve (26).
In experiments, a gradient-search method is used in order to
update alternately λ1 and λ2. Because we don’t know about
the convexity of the optimization problem in (31), we solve
it many times with different initialization of λ1 and λ2. Now,
we explain the method for solving (31) for a fixed couple
of (λ1, λ2) and how to calculate the corresponding secrecy
throughput and outage probabilities. We can observe that the
values of IDk and I
E
k at time k can be written as follows
IDk =I
D
k−1 + C
D
k · ρk, (32)
IEk =I
E
k−1 + C
E
k · ρk, (33)
where ID0 = 0 and I
E
0 = γ. This is the key point for writing
recursively the objective function in (31).
Result 4 (Dynamic programming formulation): The opti-
mization problem in (31) is reduced to (K − 1) · L1 · L2 + 1
one dimensional optimization sub-problems. The optimal rate-
adaptation policies associated with the given λ1, λ2 and γ are
obtained as solution of
Jλ1,λ2K (I
D
K−1, I
E
K−1) = min
ρK
ρK+
λ2 ·
[{
1− FCE
(
1− IEK−1
ρK
)}]
+ λ1 · FCD
(
1− IDK−1
ρK
)
,
(34)
Jλ1,λ2k (I
D
k−1, I
E
k−1) = min
ρk
ρk
+ λ2 ·
[{
1− FCD
(
1− IDk−1
ρk
)}
·
{
1− FCE
(
1− IEk−1
ρk
)}]
+ ECDk ,CEk
{
Jλ1,λ2k+1 (I
D
k−1 + C
D
k · ρk, IEk−1 + CEk · ρk)
}
,
for k < K. (35)
where FCD and FCE are the cumulative density functions of
CD and CE respectively.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The recursive nature of the above equations is characteristic
of the dynamic programming (DP). Now, to solve (34)–(35) for
given λ1 and λ2, we start from the last problem J
λ1,λ2
K , where
we should obtain the value of ρK that minimize J
λ1,λ2
K for
all values of IDK−1 and I
E
K−1. According to (13), we must be
interested in the values of IDK−1 and I
E
K−1 in the intervals T =
[0, 1) and S = [γ, 1] respectively. Thus IDK−1 and I
E
K−1 have
to be discretized to L1 and L2 points over T and S respec-
tively. Hence, ρK(IDK−1, I
E
K−1) is L1 × L2 matrix. To solve
(48), we should solve L1 ·L2 one-dimensional problems where
the only variable is ρK . In (48), and for fixed (IDK−1, I
E
K−1),
we know that (i) I(IDK−1 < 1) = 1 since IDK−1 ∈ T , (ii)
ECEK
{
I(IEK−1 + CEK · ρK > 1)
}
= 1 − FCE
( 1−IEK−1
ρK
)
and
(iii) ECDK
{
I(IDK−1 +CDK · ρK < 1)
}
= FCD
( 1−IDK−1
ρK
)
, where
FCi is the cumulative density function of Ci, i ∈ {D, E},
calculated using (3) and (4). By putting these expressions into
(45)-(48) leads to (34)-(35). The problem should be solved
starting from step K and going recursively up to k = 1 to
find all the policies ρk
(
which are L1 × L2 matrices, except
ρ1 which has one element according to (32) and (33)
)
.
Since we need to calculate the outage probabilities f0 and
fs in order to update the Lagrangian multiplier, we should
calculate the joint probability distributions of IDk and I
E
k for
k = 1, ..,K and then use them in (18) and (19).
For each set of policies, we can find the joint probability
distribution of IDk and I
E
k starting from k = 1 and going
recursively up to k = K. Due to the independence of channels,
8for k = 1 the joint cumulative density function of ID1 , I
E
1 is
FID1 IE1 (x, y) = Pr
(
ρ1 · CD1 < x, γ + ρ1 · CE1 < y
)
= FCD
(
x
ρ1
)
· FCE
(
y − γ
ρ1
)
,
which differentiated yields the joint pdf
pID1 IE1 (x, y) =
1
ρ1
· pCD
(
x
ρ1
)
· 1
ρ1
· pCE
(
y − γ
ρ1
)
, (36)
where pCD and pCE are the probability density functions of the
i.i.d random variables CD1 , .., C
D
K and C
E
1 , .., C
E
K respectively.
For k > 1, the joint cumulative density function is calcu-
lated recursively:
FIDk IEk (x, y) = Pr
(
IDk−1 +ρk ·CDk < x, IEk−1 +ρk ·CEk < y
)
=
∫ x
0
∫ y
γ
Pr
(
IDk−1 + ρk · CDk < x, IEk−1+
ρk · CEk < y
∣∣∣∣IDk−1 = α, IEk−1 = β
)
· pIDk−1IEk−1(α, β) dα dβ
=
∫ x
0
∫ y
γ
FCD
(
x− α
ρk(α, β)
)
·
FCE
(
y − β
ρk(α, β)
)
· pIDk−1IEk−1(α, β) dα dβ
thus the joint pdf obtained by differentiating the joint cu-
mulative density function can be calculated recursively using
pIDk−1IEk−1(x, y):
pIDk IEk (x, y) =
∫ x
0
∫ y
γ
1
ρk(α, β)
· pCD
(
x− α
ρk(α, β)
)
·
· 1
ρk(α, β)
· pCE
(
y − β
ρk(α, β)
)
· pIDk−1IEk−1(α, β) dα dβ. (37)
In the case where ρk(x, y) = 0 we have pIDk IEk (x, y) =
pIDk−1IEk−1(x, y). All the integrals are approximated using the
rectangular method.
For each fixed λ1 and λ2, we can calculate the secrecy
throughput (15) using pIDk IEk (x, y) and ρk(x, y) for k =
1, ...,K. The algorithm is summarized in Table I. We recall
that this throughput is obtained for an arbitrary fixed γ ∈ [0, 1].
Now we discuss the choice of γ. In the simulations, we ob-
serve that the secrecy throughput increases when γ increases.
However, when γ is greater than a certain value between 0
and 1, it is impossible to obtain outage probabilities less than
target probabilities regardless of λ1 and λ2 values. Thus the
best choice γ∗ is the maximum value of γ which can verify
outage probabilities constraints.
B. Constrained secrecy throughput optimization in case 2
We study here case 2 where the transmitter obtains no
feedback from the eavesdropper but only from legitimate
receiver. Consequently, IDk−1 is the only parameter used by the
transmitter to adapt the redundancy ρk. As in case 1, γ is fixed
and the secrecy throughput η is maximized by minimizing the
denominator of (15), f0 and fs at the same time. Exhaustive
search method is used to optimize γ as in case 1.
The optimization problem for a fixed γ can be written as
follows:
Lλ1,λ2 = min
ρ1,...,ρK
K∑
k=1
EIDk−1
{
ρk(I
D
k−1)
}
+ λ1 · f0 + λ2 · fs
(38)
= min
ρ1,...,ρK
K∑
k=1
EIDk−1
{
ρk(I
D
k−1)
}
+ λ1 · EIDK
[
I
(
IDK < 1
)]
+ λ2 ·
K−1∑
k=1
EIDk
[
I
(
IDk−1 < 1
)− I(IDk < 1)] · Pr (IEk > 1)
+ λ2 · EIDK−1
[
I
(
IDK−1 < 1
)] · Pr (IEK > 1). (39)
In case 1, solving the optimization problem was equivalent, for
a fixed γ, λ1 and λ2, to solve (34) and (35) for k = 1, ..,K.
All optimization problems in (34), (35) are done off-line for
all the values of IEk−1. Thus in this case, the output of the
problems (34), (35), i.e., the ρk will depend also on the value
of IEk−1. Then to calculate the secrecy outage probability, we
have derived the joint pdf pIDk IEk , for k = 1, ..,K, and we have
used them in (18) and (19). However, in case 2, we cannot use
IEk−1 as a state in a dynamic programming method as in case 1,
since ρk depends only on IDk−1. Thus to solve problem (39), we
should obtain the pdf z¯k of IEk , as a function of optimization
variables, to evaluate fsk = Pr(IEk > 1) in equation (19) and
to use it in (39), where IEk =
∑k
l=1 C
E
l · ρl + γ. The pdf z¯k
can be expressed as
z¯k(x) = z1(x) ∗ ... ∗ zk(x) (40)
= z¯k−1(x) ∗ zk(x), (41)
where ∗ is the convolution operator and zl are the pdf of
random variables Rl = CEl · ρl. However, using the exact
expression of the pdf z¯k makes the problem intractable by
dynamic programming method, since if we consider z¯k−1 as a
second state, we need to solve the sub-optimization problems
for all the values of the state z¯k−1 which vary between 0
and ∞ (see eg. [11]). To make the optimization problem
tractable, an approximation of the i.i.d. random variables Rl
by Gaussian variables can be used as in [19], [11]. However,
using Gaussian approximation requires to solve a dynamic
programming optimization problem with three-dimensional
state which is time consuming. We propose here an alternative
which consists in using the results obtained in the previous
section for case 1. Thus to solve problem (39), we use as an
intermediate step the expressions of ρk obtained for case 1
when ρk is a function of IDk−1 and I
E
k−1, for fixed λ1 and λ2.
9Table I
THE ALGORITHM USED TO SOLVE (31) FOR A FIXED γ ∈ [0, 1].
Step 0 λ1 ← λ(0)1 , λ2 ← λ(0)2
Step ` 0. Set λ1 ← λ(`−1)1 and λ2 ← λ(`−1)2
1. Solve Jλ
(`−1)
1 ,λ
(`−1)
2 in (31) to obtain ρk for k = 1, ..,K:
1.1. Start with k = K, find the 2-D function ρk(IDk−1, I
E
k−1):
for iD = 0 : ∆i : 1
for iE = γ : ∆i : 1
Solve (34) with IDk−1 = i
D and IEk−1 = i
E
end for
end for
1.2. Go recursively back and solve (35) for k = K − 1, .., 2 using the off-line procedure in 1.1.
1.3. For k = 1 solve (35) only with IDk−1 = 0 and I
E
k−1 = γ, then obtain ρ1
2. Calculate the joint pdf of IDk and I
E
k for k = 1, ..,K using (36), (37) and the ρk obtained in 1.
2.1. Start with k = 1, find pID1 IE1
(x, y) using (36) as follows:
for iD = 0 : ∆i : iDm
for iE = γ : ∆i : iEm
Calculate pID1 IE1
(iD, iE) using (36) where iDm and iEm are fixed in simulations such that pID1 IE1 (x, y)
is negligible for x > iDm or y > iEm
end for
end for
2.2. Calculate the joint pdf of IDk and I
E
k for k = 2, ..,K using (37) and the same method in 2.1.
3. Using the joint pdf in 2., calculate the connection outage probability f
(λ
(`−1)
1 ,λ
(`−1)
2 )
0 using (18).
4. Update λ1: λ
(`)
1 = [λ
(`−1)
1 + β(f
(λ
(`−1)
1 ,λ
(`−1)
2 )
0 − ξ)]+
where [.]+ = max(., 0)
5. Repeat steps 1. and 2. with λ1 ← λ(`)1 , λ2 ← λ(`−1)2
6. Calculate the outage f
(λ
(`)
1 ,λ
(`−1)
2 )
s using (19).
7. Update λ2: λ
(`)
2 = [λ
(`−1)
2 + β(f
(λ
(`)
1 ,λ
(`−1)
2 )
s − ξs)]+
Stopping |λ(`)1 − λ(`−1)1 | ≤ 1
criterion |λ(`)2 − λ(`−1)2 | ≤ 2
β, 1 and 2 are chosen in experiments to be sufficiently small.
Since in case 2, ρk is a function of IDk−1 only, we propose to
marginalize ρk w.r.t. IEk−1 as the following
ρk(I
D
k−1) =
∫ ∞
γ
ρk(I
D
k−1, x) ·
pIDk−1IEk−1(I
D
k−1, x)∫∞
γ
pIDk−1IEk−1(I
D
k−1, y)dy
· dx,
(42)
for k = 1, ..,K, where pIDk−1IEk−1 are the joint pdf calculated
in case 1. The joint pdf pIDk IEk must be calculated again for
k = 1, ..,K, using ρk = ρk(IDk−1) in (42).
The solution in (42) provides a less computational demand-
ing method to obtain ρk as a function of IDk−1 only.
VI. NUMERICAL APPLICATION
In this section we provide numerical examples for the
secrecy throughput maximization problem under outage con-
straints in the two considered cases of rate adaptation.
Figure 3, depicts the secrecy throughput η as a function
of the maximum number of transmissions K using the “non-
adaptive scheme” described in [9] (see Fig.7 in [9]) and
the two adaptive INR schemes described in this paper. The
parameter settings are as follows: h = 15 dB, g = 5 dB,
ξ = 10
−3 and ξs = 10−3.
As explained above, there is an intrinsic tradeoff between
the throughput to the destination and the information leak-
age to the eavesdropper: larger sub-codewords increase the
throughput, but also reduce the level of secrecy, since the
eavesdropper can obtain more information from the received
signal. Therefore, the result of the optimization can be fully
evaluated by looking at the secrecy throughput vs K, the sub-
codewords lengths being (hidden) optimization parameters.
The results show that a notable gain is obtained using the
rate-adaptive schemes (cases 1 and 2) when K > 3. However,
when K is small, e.g. for K = 1 or 3, the secrecy throughput
η is still negligible using adaptive schemes due to insufficient
diversity. The secrecy throughput converges when K → ∞
to the ergodic value η∗ = E
[
C(H) − C(G)] = 1.31 where
C(x) = 12 · log2(1 + x) and the distributions of H and G
are given in (3) and (4). For K = 11, the case 1 of rate
adaptation achieves 48% of η∗ while the non-adaptive scheme
achieves only 32%. We observe in Figure 3, that the gain
case 2 (more realistic since only a feedback from legitimate
receiver is considered) has a performance in terms of secrecy
rate which is very close to that of case 1 (not very realistic,
since it requires cooperation from the eavesdropper). This is
clearly due to the fact that the eavesdropper has a somewhat
poor channel, which does not allow him to understand much
of the transmitted signal.
Now, consider another average SNRs setting as follows: h¯ =
10 dB and g¯ = 5 dB. In this case, when K →∞ the secrecy
throughput approaches the ergodic secrecy capacity which is
equal to η∗ = 0.59. Obviously, decreasing the gap between
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Figure 3. Secrecy throughput η versus the maximum number of transmissions
K. ξ = ξs = 10−3, (h¯, g¯) = (15, 5) dB.
average SNRs will decrease the ergodic secrecy capacity. In
experiments, we first considered the same target outage prob-
abilities as in the previous example ξs = ξ = 10−3 and we
tested all the values of K ∈ {3, 5, 7, 9}. However, for all these
values of K we obtained null secrecy throughput in case 1 of
rate adaptation due to the bad channel conditions: the channel
statistics never allows to reach this level of secrecy outage.
Thus we have studied the secrecy throughput for greater outage
probabilities when ξs = ξ = 10−2. Figure 4, shows the
maximal secrecy throughput versus K in this case study. We
observe that in this example, the gap in secrecy throughput
between case 1 and case 2 is noticeable. This is because,
when we have the advantage of a feedback channel from
the eavesdropper, bad channel conditions can be compensated
by knowing about the situation at the eavesdropper. When
K = 13, case 1 can achieve 43.5% of η∗, versus only 21% in
case 2. Figure 4 shows also that the first non-null secrecy
throughput η when ξs = ξ = 10−2 for the non-adaptive
scheme is obtained when K = 13, i.e. we need 6 more
transmissions to achieves a non-null η compared to adaptive
schemes.
As a result, one can conclude that using multi-bit feed-
back channels by the transmitter to adapt the redundancy at
each transmission is very advantageous compared to the non-
adaptive scheme with ACK/NACK feedback channel.
We recall that the secrecy throughput is maximized w.r.t. ρk
for k = 1, ..,K and the ratio of secret bits transmitted γ. The
values of γ, obtained from the algorithm proposed in Table I
to solve problem (25), are given in Figure 5 as a (increasing)
function of the maximum number of transmissions K. We
observe that the secrecy throughput is increasing with γ.
Indeed, when K is small, the reliability condition in (10) will
impose the transmitter to provide sufficient redundancy from
the first transmissions which leads to small possible values of
γ in order to achieve the secrecy condition in (12). We observe
also that for a fixed K, the largest value of γ is obtained for the
adaptive scheme in case 1, due to the presence of two feedback
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Figure 4. Secrecy throughput η vs the maximum number of transmissions
K. ξ = ξs = 10−2, (h¯, g¯) = (10, 5) dB.
Figure 5. The values of γ = Rs
R0
outputted by the proposed algorithm versus
the maximum number of transmissions K.
channels from legitimate receiver and eavesdropper. Since in
case 2, there is a lack of information from eavesdropper side,
the transmitter needs to add more dummy bits in order to en-
sure secrecy which leads to smaller γ than case 1. In the non-
adaptive scheme, there is also no information about (outdated)
CSI from the legitimate receiver; so, according to (10) the
transmitter needs to add more redundancy comparing to case
2 in order to assure reliable transmission
(
remember that in the
non-adaptive scheme ρk = ρ, ∀k in (10)
)
. Thus the maximal
possible value of γ to achieve a secure communication will
decrease according to (12) w.r.t case 2.
The size of the sub-codewords can be determined using the
values of ρk , k = 1, ..,K, and γ obtained from the proposed
algorithm as well as the feedback value(s). Indeed, we have
ρk =
Nk
M0
, where M0 = Mi + Md, Mi is the number of
information bits which is known at the transmitter and Md
is the number of dummy bits which can be obtained using
the value of γ (i.e., γ = MiMi+Md ). Then, the size of the sub-
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codewords for the kth transmission is equal to Nk = ρkM0.
In Figures 6–9, we show, as example, the adaptation policies
ρk in case 1 obtained using the proposed algorithm in Table I,
for the transmission k = 2, 3, 4, 5 respectively when K = 5,
γ = 0.09, (h¯, g¯) = (15, 5) dB and ξs = ξ = 10−3. For
k = 1, the rate adaptation solution is equal to ρ1 = 0.2.
The ρk are two dimensional functions of IDk−1 and I
E
k−1 when
k > 1 in case 1. We recall that when IDk−1 ≥ 1, ρk = 0 and
when IEk−1 ≥ 1, ρk(IDk−1, IEk−1) = ρk(IDk−1, 1). An another
example is shown in Figure 10, for the rate adaptation solution
ρk in case 2, for each k = 1, .., 5 when K = 5, γ = 0.07,
(h¯, g¯) = (15, 5) dB and ξs = ξ = 10−3. Obviously, we
observe in Figures 6–10, that when the amount of accumulated
information at the legitimate receiver (IDk−1) is small, the
transmitter would have to use long sub-codewords to ensure a
successful decoding of the information message. We note that
in case 2, the rate adaptation solution obtained in experiments
require for some considered values of K, what is called
“packet-dropping” in [11]: knowing in the kth transmission
that the accumulated mutual information IDk−1 at the legitimate
receiver is below a threshold Ith the transmitter terminates the
HARQ process, i.e. ρk(IDk−1) = 0, when I
D
k−1 < Ith.
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Figure 6. ρ2(ID1 , I
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1 ) in case 1
when γ = 0.09, K = 5, (h¯, g¯) =
(15, 5) dB, ξs = ξ = 10−3.
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Figure 7. ρ3(ID2 , I
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2 ) in case 1
when γ = 0.09, K = 5, (h¯, g¯) =
(15, 5) dB, ξs = ξ = 10−3.
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3 ) in case 1
when γ = 0.09, K = 5, (h¯, g¯) =
(15, 5) dB, ξs = ξ = 10−3.
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Figure 9. ρ5(ID4 , I
E
4 ) in case 1
when γ = 0.09, K = 5, (h¯, g¯) =
(15, 5) dB, ξs = ξ = 10−3.
VII. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
This paper addresses the reliable and secure communi-
cation over block-fading wiretap channel based on incre-
mental redundancy secure HARQ protocol. The transmitter
has no instantaneous CSI but knows channel statistics. We
have studied two cases of secure HARQ protocols. In the
first case, the transmitter can receive information from both
legitimate receiver and eavesdropper via multi-bit feedback
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Figure 10. ρk(IDk−1) in case 2 when γ = 0.07, K = 5, (h¯, g¯) = (15, 5)
dB, ξs = ξ = 10−3.
channels while in the second case there is sole feedback
from legitimate receiver, which is much more realistic. We
analyzed rate adaptation for both cases using outdated CSI and
we used dynamic programming method to solve the secrecy
throughput optimization problem under outage constraints. We
have shown via examples that multi-bit feedback combined
with rate adaptation can bring noticeable improvements in
terms of secrecy throughput compared to the non-adaptive
scheme in [9]. We have also observed that the gap between
the secrecy throughput in the case 1 and the case 2 depends on
channel conditions and the maximum number of transmission
K, and can be quite small.
An extension of this work could be also to optimize the
number of additional dummy bits (or γ) in each transmission,
while it is here optimized for the whole transmission; this can
improve the secrecy throughput as shown in [17]. Another
extension to increase applicability of the results would be
to consider finite input alphabets, since a Gaussian alphabet
which was considered in this paper is not implementable in
practice.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF RESULT 4
By using the dependencies of IDk and I
E
k on C
D
1 , .., C
D
k and
CE1 , .., C
E
k respectively, and using (18) and (19) we can write
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(31) as follows:
Jλ1,λ2 =
min
ρ1,...,ρK
ECD1 ,..,CDK−1,CE1 ,..,CEK−1
{
K∑
k=1
ρk(I
D
k−1, I
E
k−1)
}
+ λ1 ·
[
ECD1 ,..,CDK
{
I(IDK < 1)
}]
+ λ2 ·
K−1∑
k=1
[
ECD1 ,..,CDk
{
I(IDk−1 < 1)− I(IDk < 1)
}
·
ECE1 ,..,CEk
{
I(IEk > 1)
}]
+ λ2 ·
[
ECD1 ,..,CDK−1
{
I(IDK−1 < 1)
}
·
ECE1 ,..,CEK
{
I(IEK > 1)
}]
(43)
Using (32) and (33) and due to the independence of the main
channel and eavesdropper’s channel, the previous optimization
problem is equivalent to solve:
Jλ1,λ2 = min
ρ1,...,ρK
ECD1 ,CE1
{
ρ1 + λ2 ·
[{
I(ID0 < 1)−
I(ID0 + CD1 · ρ1 < 1)
}
·
{
I(IE0 + CE1 · ρ1 > 1)
}]
+ ECD2 ,CE2
{
ρ2 + λ2 ·
[{
I(ID1 < 1)
− I(ID1 + CD2 · ρ2 < 1)
}
·
{
I(IE1 + CE2 · ρ2 > 1)
}]
+ ....
+ ECDK ,CEK
{
ρK + λ1 · I(IDK−1 + CDK · ρK < 1) + λ2·[{
I(IDK−1 < 1)
}
·
{
I(IEK−1 + CEK · ρK > 1)
}]
}
...
}}
. (44)
We observe that the initial complicated problem can be sim-
plified by breaking it into simpler subproblems in a recursive
manner:
Jλ1,λ2 = Jλ1,λ21 (I
D
0 , I
E
0 ) (45)
Jλ1,λ21 (I
D
0 , I
E
0 ) = min
ρ1
ECD1 ,CE1
{
ρ1 + λ2 ·
[{
I(ID0 < 1)−
I(ID0 + CD1 · ρ1 < 1)
}
·
{
I(IE0 + CE1 · ρ1 > 1)
}]
+ Jλ1,λ22 (I
D
0 + C
D
1 · ρ1, IE0 + CE1 · ρ1)
}
. (46)
Jλ1,λ22 (I
D
1 , I
E
1 ) = min
ρ2
ECD2 ,CE2
{
ρ2 + λ2 ·
[{
I(ID1 < 1)−
I(ID1 + CD2 · ρ2 < 1)
}
·
{
I(IE1 + CE2 · ρ2 > 1)
}]
+ Jλ1,λ23 (I
D
1 + C
D
2 · ρ2, IE1 + CE2 · ρ2)
}
. (47)
...
Jλ1,λ2K (I
D
K−1, I
E
K−1) = min
ρK
ECDK ,CEK
{
ρK+
λ2 ·
[{
I(IDK−1 < 1)
}
·
{
I(IEK−1 + CEK · ρK > 1)
}]
+ λ1 · I(IDK−1 + CDK · ρK < 1). (48)
which leads to the desired result.
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